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ESTATE TAX REPEAL UNDER EGTRRA:
A PROPOSAL FOR SIMPLIFICATION
Sergio Pareja*
Editors' Synopsis: This Article generally discusses the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and proposes a relatively
simple change that would simplify and reduce the costs of estate
planning. Specifically, the Article proposes that thefirst spouse's unused
basisstep-up shouldbe transferredto the surviving spouse automatically
at the death of the first spouse.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2001, Congress and President George W. Bush enacted the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
("EGTRRA").' One of the most celebrated changes of this $1.35 trillion
tax cut was the repeal of the federal estate tax in 2010. Although this
repeal currently is scheduled to last for only one year (2010), possibly all
or some of the provisions of EGTRRA, including estate tax repeal, may be
made permanent. Regardless of whether repeal is made permanent, the
mere possibility of repeal for any amount of time will alter the estate plans
of large estates.
Among the many arguments for estate tax repeal, one of the most
compelling is that repeal will reduce the complexity of the Internal
Revenue Code (the "Code") and thereby simplify estate planning.2
Arguably, this simplification will eliminate the tax-motivated need for
estate planning, saving people large amounts of money that otherwise
would go to attorneys' fees. 3 This money, the argument goes, will be
reinvested in the economy.4 Unfortunately, at least as to basic estate

I See Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
2 For the

major arguments for repeal, see discussion infra Part II.C.
3 See infra Part II.C.
4 See infra Part II.C.
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planning and estate administration for wealthy families with highly
appreciated assets, this argument lacks merit.
During repeal, a new estate planning technique, one that this Article's
author calls the "step-up trust," which will supplant the current "credit
shelter trust," will plague married taxpayers of significant wealth.5 This
new technique will be the method of choice for a wealthy married couple
to take full advantage of a new $1.3 million step-up in income tax basis for
assets passing to someone other than a surviving spouse. 6 Although
somewhat different from a credit shelter trust, this new technique will share
many of the same characteristics of a credit shelter trust, including
expenses and administrative difficulties. 7
This Article does not address the issue of whether estate tax repeal
under EGTRRA should be made permanent from a tax policy perspective.8
Instead, this Article assumes that estate tax repeal will occur for at least one
year, whether or not this is sound tax policy. 9 In that context, this Article
proposes a relatively simple change to EGTRRA, which will help simplify
and reduce the costs of estate planning: the first spouse's unused basis stepup should be transferred to the surviving spouse automatically at the death
of the first spouse.

II. OVERVIEW OF REPEAL UNDER EGTRRA
A. EGTRRA in General
President Bush signed EGTRRA on June 7, 2001.10 This tax law made
many significant changes to the Code. Absent further legislation, each of
these changes "sunsets" or expires at midnight on December 31, 2010, at
which time the Code is reinstated exactly as it was prior to the enactment

5 See, e.g., Dan T. Hastings & Richard B. Covey, Recent Developments (2001)
in
Transfer Taxes and Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, Thirty-Sixth Ann. Philip E.
Heckerling INST. ON EST. PLAN. at 48-63.
6

See id.

7 See id.
8 Many articles address the issue of whether estate tax repeal under EGTRRA is wise

from a tax policy perspective. See, e.g., Stephen Vasek, Death Tax Repeal: Alternative
Reform Proposals,92 TAx NOTES 955 (2001).
9 Congressional leaders should consider the issues raised in this Article even if
repeal
lasts only one year. Furthermore, Congress should consider these issues any time Congress
proposes
10 to alter the unlimited step-up in income tax basis at death.
See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
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of EGTRRA." The following list, quoted from CCH's 2002 U.S. Master
Tax Guide, "highlights some of the new and more immediate changes" of
EGTRRA:
(1) a new 10% [income tax] bracket and reductions to other
brackets for 2001 and beyond;
(2) the eventual repeal of the itemized deduction and personal
exemption phaseouts;
(3) increases to the child tax credit for 2001 and beyond;
(4) changes to the dependent care credit and the adoption
credit, as well as the creation of a new credit under the general
business credit for employers providing child care;
(5) changes to the student loan interest deduction and
education IRA rules, as well as a new 2002 "above-the-line"
deduction for higher education expenses;
repeal of the
(6) numerous changes implementing the eventual
2
estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes;
(7) numerous changes regarding pension contributions,
funding, distributions, and rollovers;
(8) a short deferral period for all or a part of the required
corporate quarterly estimated tax payments due in September 2001
and 2004; and
(9) increases to the [Alternative Minimum Tax] exemption
amounts for 2001-2004.13
B. Specific Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Changes
Under EGTRRA
Under EGTRRA, the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount is increased in
stages through the year 2009. In 2003, the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount
is $1 million.'4 In 2004 and 2005, the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount is

11 See id at § 901. There is currently one exception to this sunsetting. On
December 17, 2002, President Bush signed a measure into law that repeals the sunset of one
provision of EGTRRA that exempts Holocaust survivors and their heirs from paying taxes
on restitution claims. Before the bill reached the President, the House approved the bill on
June 4, 2002 with a 392-1 vote and the Senate approved the bill on November 20, 2002 with
a unanimous vote. See Patti Mohr, Bush Signs Tax Exemption for Holocaust Survivors'
Restitution Claims, 2002 TNT 243-1 (Dec. 17, 2002).
12 For a detailed description of the significant Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping
Transfer Tax changes under EGTRRA, see discussion infra Part II.B.
1.
13 CCH, INC., 2002 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE
14 See I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2001).
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$1.5 million. 15 In 2006 through 2008, the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount is
$2 million 16 In 2009, the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount is $3.5 million 7
Unlike the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount, the Gift Tax Exclusion
Amount does not change." This amount is fixed "permanently" at $1
million. 9
In addition to the changes to the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount,
EGTRRA gradually decreases the top estate and gift tax rates through
2009. The new scheduled top rates and the years in which they go into
effect are as follows: 50% in 2002, 49% in 2003, 48% in 2004, 47% in
2005, 46% in 2006, and 45% in 2007 through 2009.20
Apart from the changes to the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount and the
estate tax rate changes, EGTRRA also increases the generation-skipping
transfer ("GST") tax exemption amount (the "GSTT Exemption Amount")
in stages through 2009. In 2002, the GSTT Exemption Amount was $1.1
million.2' In 2003, it is $1.12 million, an inflation-adjusted amount.22 In
2004 and 2005, it is $1.5 million.23 In 2006 through 2008, it is $2 million.24
In 2009, it is $3.5 million.25
The changes described above, which will occur through 2009, are
insignificant compared to the change that will occur in 2010. In that year,
the estate tax and the GST tax are repealed, but the gift tax is not
repealed.26 As mentioned above, this repeal currently is scheduled to last
for one year because all EGTRRA changes expire at midnight on
December 31, 2010.27 However, President Bush and a significant number
15 See id.
16

17
18
19

See id.
See id.

See id. § 2505(a)(1).
This statement makes the unrealistic assumption that there will be no future tax

legislation. Nevertheless, the law now provides that the Gift Tax Exclusion Amount is a
fixed number ($1,000,000). See id.
20 See id. § 2001(c). EGTRRA also reduces the top state death tax credit (12% in
2002, 8% in 2003, and 4% in 2004) until its complete repeal in 2005. See id § 2011 (b)(2).
Starting in the year 2005, a deduction replaces the state death tax credit. See id. § 2058.
21 See id. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c).
22
See id. § 2631 (c)(1)(B); see also CCH, INC., 2003 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE 2943.
23 See I.R.C. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c).
24 See id.
25 See id.
26
See id. § 2210.
27 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38, § 901 (2001). As mentioned above, there is currently one exception
to this sunsetting. See supra note 11.
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of members of Congress would like to make all provisions of EGTRRA
permanent.28 At this point, predicting with certainty whether they will be
successful is impossible. Thus, repeal may or may not last beyond 2010.
C. Reasons for Estate Tax Repeal
According to Professor Stephen Vasek of the University of Kentucky
College of Law,
Reasons given for repeal of death taxes [under EGTRRA]
include: (1) to improve the low personal savings rate in the U.S.;
(2) to perpetuate the basic "American dream" of providing for
one's children and loved ones; (3) to reduce the complexity,
compliance burdens, and administrative burdens of current tax
laws; (4) to prevent the destruction of small businesses and family
farms; and (5) to end the "double" taxation of income, first under
the income tax law and then again at death under the estate tax
law.29
With respect to reducing the complexity and the compliance and administrative burdens of current tax laws, Professor Vasek notes that "the
National Federation of Independent Business estimated that the government
and individuals collectively spend some 65 cents for each dollar of estate
and gift tax collected-that's $5 to $6 billion annually-for enforcement
3
and compliance activities. 1
Others have also argued that EGTRRA will simplify estate planning so
that less money will be lost to estate planning attorneys. As stated by
Senator Grassley at a May 21, 2001 U.S. Senate hearing on EGTRRA,
"[P]robably the money that is wasted in this country on estate tax planning
is the biggest waste of the productive resources in this country that you can
28

See, e.g., Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, GOP Leaders Call Election Victory a

"'Referendum"on Bush Policies, 2002 TNT 216-1 (Nov. 6, 2002):
Senate Finance Committee ranking member Charles E. Grassley, R-lowa,
who is expected to resume his post as the committee chair in the next Congress,
outlined a new agenda.... Grassley also said he will push to make last year's tax
cuts permanent. "The tax cuts help taxpayers across the board with child care,
rate cuts, education incentives, and retirement savings incentives," he said.
"They help to create jobs.... If we don't make the tax cuts permanent, small
businesses will pay a tax penalty of almost 15 percent in 2011 ."
Id. atI 7-9.
Vasek, supra note 8, at 956.
3
Id.at 956 n. 16 (quoting Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on
Reducing Tax Burdens, 105th Cong., 105-97 (1998) (statement of the Hon. Jim McCrery)).
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have."'" U.S. Representative Cox stated that "[c]omplete and immediate
Death Tax repeal is the single most effective growth measure we can enact
to direct resources away from non-productive tax planning and toward jobcreation, higher wages, and lower prices for consumers. 32 In a press
release, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer stated that "[t]he other
big area of simplification [of the Code], which is major, is repeal of the
death tax."33 Implicit in each of these statements is the notion that repeal of
the estate tax will eliminate the need to pay estate planning attorneys for
tax planning.34 These savings, in turn, will be reinvested in the U.S.
economy.
D. Income Tax Changes at Death Under EGTRRA
Under current law (through 2009), a beneficiary of a decedent's estate
generally takes a basis in the inherited property equal to the property's fair
market value as of the decedent's date of death.35 In addition to saving
income taxes when an estate consists predominantly of appreciated assets,
the unlimited step-up in basis simplifies basis tracking for the beneficiaries

21, 2001).
Rep. Christopher Cox, Cox Reintroduces Estate Tax Repeal, 2001 TNT 21-20

31 147 CONG.REC. S 5185, 5211 (daily ed. May
32

(Jan. 33
30, 2001), at 2.
Ari Fleischer, The White House RegularBriefing, FEDERALNEWS SERVICE, Feb. 26,
2001, at 74. In this speech, Mr. Fleischer went on to state that the
estate tax, the death tax, is one of the largest loopholes in the code, that invites
CPAs and lawyers to figure out ends around, which complicate the tax code. If
there is anybody who has a lot to lose in the President's budget proposal, it's tax
lawyers and accountants. If you repeal the death tax, a lot of them are going to
lose their ability to carry out their livelihood, which is to help people avoid
paying taxes.
Id.
34 Presumably estate planning will continue to be necessary for nontax reasons, such
as the selection of the recipients of one's assets, as well as the timing and manner of receipt
(i.e., through a trust for minor beneficiaries).
35 See I.R.C. § 1014 (Supp. 2001). The basis is stepped up or stepped down to the
assets' fair market value on the decedent's date of death under I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1), or, if the
alternate valuation date is used on the decedent's estate tax return, the basis is stepped up
or stepped down to the fair market value on the alternate valuation date under I.R.C. §
1014(a)(2).
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of the estate and reduces the effect of double taxation. 36 EGTRRA
significantly changes this current law in 2010.
Under EGTRRA, the unlimited step-up in basis is repealed when the
estate tax is repealed.3 7 Instead of an unlimited step-up at death, EGTRRA
provides that assets passing from the decedent to any person other than the
decedent's spouse will receive a step-up of up to $1.3 million; assets
passing to the decedent's spouse will receive a step-up of up to $3
million.38 These changes will completely change the way estate planning
will be done in a post-repeal world.39
11.

ESTATE PLANNING AFTER REPEAL

A. In General
Estate planning attorneys already are discussing ways to plan in
anticipation of, as well as after, repeal.4 ° For large estates with highly
appreciated assets, this is more difficult than planning prior to repeal. Prior
to repeal, the most basic of estate planning tax concepts was and is the
credit shelter trust.41
B. Credit Shelter Trusts Before Repeal
Credit shelter trusts (or "family trusts" or "bypass trusts") are familiar
to all estate planning attorneys. The origin of credit shelter trusts, as they
now exist, traces back in great part to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 (the "1976 Act").42 The 1976 Act was significant with respect to
36

"The general purpose of the stepped-up basis rule is to avoid double taxation,
subjecting the same property to both estate taxation and income taxation when the asset is
sold after the decedent's death." Steven Akers, Planningfor Large Estates, ALI-ABA, 1,
7 (Nov. 2001). According to Professor Lawrence Zelenak, the stepped-up basis at death
serves an important simplification purpose by avoiding proof of basis problems for small
estates. See Lawrence Zelenak. Taxing Gains at Death,46 VAND. L. REv. 361,363 (1993).
37 See I.R.C. §§ 1014(0, 2210 (2002). Although this is not necessarily the case, if
estate and gift tax repeal under EGTRRA is made permanent, the repeal of the unlimited
step-up and step-down in basis is also likely to become permanent.
T8See id § 1022.
39 This assumes that the estate is large enough and has enough appreciation for income
taxes to be an issue.
40 See, e.g., Hastings & Covey, supra note 5, at 48-49.
41 See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, ET AL., TAXATION OF ESTATES GIFTS & TRUSTS 27,415
(1994); see also HAROLD WEINSTOCK & MARTIN NEUMANN, PLANNING AN ESTATE: A
GUIDEBOOK OF PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES § 5:1, at 94 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the uses
and Wes of bypass trusts).
See Jay A. Soled, A Proposalto Make Credit Shelter Trusts Obsolete, 51 TAX LAW.
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credit shelter trusts because (a) it unified gift and estate taxes and (b) it
expanded the marital deduction to the greater of one-half of a decedent's
estate or $250,000.43 This change was significant because for the first time
a decedent could potentially leave his or her entire estate to a surviving
spouse without paying any estate tax (if the decedent had total assets of
$250,000 or less). By doing this, however, a decedent would be in effect
"wasting" his or her unified credit, which after the 1976 Act was set at
$30,000. 44
As a result of the 1976 Act, estate planning attorneys began drafting
credit shelter trusts to absorb the first-spouse-to-die's unified credit. The
basic idea was to draft the trust so that the surviving spouse would have as
much access to the trust as possible without resulting in inclusion of the
assets of that trust in the surviving spouse's estate upon the surviving
spouse's subsequent death.4 5 Although the surviving spouse could not have
absolute control over the credit shelter trust without the entire trust being
included in the surviving spouse's estate, the trust could be structured to
provide the surviving spouse, at most, with an income interest, a right of
withdrawal (typically limited to the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the trust
assets), a special power of appointment, and a right to distributions of
principal either in the trustee's discretion or based on an "ascertainable
standard. '46 The surviving spouse could even be designated as the sole

83, 84-86 (1997).
43 Prior to the 1976 Act, the marital deduction had been limited, since 1948, to onehalf of a decedent's estate (i.e., there was no unlimited marital deduction). See Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1846 (1978); Revenue Act of
1948, 62 Stat. 168 (1949).
44 See Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2001(a)(1), 90 Stat. at 1848. For example, a
decedent with an estate of $250,000 or less might leave his or her entire estate to the
surviving spouse. This would result in no estate tax at the first spouse's death. However,
if the surviving spouse's estate were to exceed the amount shielded by his or her available
credit at that spouse's later death, then an estate tax at that time could have been avoided or,
at least, reduced. In the year that the 1976 Act went into effect (1977), a $30,000 unified
credit was available to shield an estate of $120,667 from taxes. The credit amount
gradually increased through 1987 when it reached $192,800, shielding an estate of $600,000
from taxes. The credit stayed at $192,800 until 1998. The current system has replaced the
unified credit with an "exemption equivalent amount" based on the amount shielded by the
credit. The total amount that can be shielded by transfer during life or at death is currently
$1 million. At present, therefore, the idea is to avoid wasting the first-spouse-to-die's $1
million exemption. See I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000).
45 See Soled, supra note 42, at 85.
46 The objective is to ensure that the surviving spouse is not treated as holding a
general power of appointment over the trust by virtue of his or her degree of control over
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trustee with a power to make distributions of principal as long as distributions were made in accordance with an ascertainable standard.4 7
As mentioned above, the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount and Gift Tax
Exclusion Amount are currently both equal to $1 million.48 A use of a
taxpayer's Gift Tax Exclusion Amount during life effectively reduces,
dollar for dollar, that taxpayer's available Estate Tax Exclusion Amount at
death. This means that, under current law,49 each taxpayer may give a total
of $1 million to others during life or at death without incurring any gift or
estate taxes.50 If this $1 million is not used during life or at death, it is
wasted because the unused portion cannot be left to anyone, including a
surviving spouse, at death.5 Because of this, credit shelter trusts are still,
as they were after the 1976 Act, the estate planning method of choice to
avoid wasting the first-spouse-to-die's unused exclusion amount.52
Despite the relatively broad flexibility of credit shelter trusts, most
people, in the case of a first marriage with no issues of marital strife, would
prefer to leave assets outright to their spouses. 53 In each case in which this
is true, the Code is in effect inducing the taxpayer-the decedent-to
establish a credit shelter trust solely for tax reasons.54 What is it about the

the trust. See I.R.C. § 2041 (2000). See also WEINSTOCK & NEUMANN, supra note 41,
§§ 5:3-5:5, at 97-99 (discussing general powers of appointment and the power to invade
under an ascertainable standard). If death occurs while a limited right of withdrawal
remains unexercised, a proportionate part of the trust will be included in the decedent's
gross estate under I.R.C. § 2041. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(3) (1958).
47 See Estate of Vissering v. Comm'r, 990 F.2d 578, 580-81 (10th Cir. 1993).
48 These amounts are scheduled to differ from each other in the future. For example,
in the year 2004, the Estate Tax Exclusion Amount will be $1.5 million while the Gift Tax
Exclusion Amount will remain fixed at $1 million.
49 The current law is EGTRRA in the year 2003 as well as after expiration of the
provisions of EGTRRA after the year 2010, assuming no further tax legislation.
50 The $1 million combined amount is unaffected by annual exclusion gifts. These
gifts are present interest gifts not in excess of a current inflation-adjusted amount of
$11,000 per year per donee. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2000).
51 For an excellent article suggesting that the unified credit-the predecessor to the
applicable exclusion amount-should be transformed into an exemption transferable to the
surviving spouse, see Soled, supra note 42, at 83.
52 See CAMPFIELD, ET AL., supra note 41, at 27,415.
53 See Soled, supra note 42, at 83.
54 Commentators have suggested that this inducement hampers economic growth
because placing assets in trust affects the potential ways that those assets, as well as other
assets received by a surviving spouse, are invested. See, e.g., Edward J. Gac & Sharon K.
Brougham, A Proposalfor Restructuring the Taxation of Wealth Transfers: Tax Reform
Redux?, 5 AKRON TAX J. 75, 82 (1988).
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use of credit shelter trusts that would cause people to prefer leaving assets
outright to their spouses?
There are many issues with credit shelter trusts.5 The first issue
concerns funding the trust. In the absence of assets that may easily be
divided, such as cash and marketable securities, fractionalizing assets is
often necessary. For example, it may be necessary for the credit shelter
trust to own a certain percentage of the real estate as a tenant in common.56
Second, even if the surviving spouse is the sole trustee, the surviving
spouse has obligations as a fiduciary to the remainder beneficiaries of the
trust.57 If a falling out with those remainder beneficiaries were to occur, the
surviving spouse would need to be very careful or he or she could be
subject to liability. 8 Third, if other trustees are involved, the surviving
spouse may have difficulty convincing the other trustees to make
distributions. 9 Fourth, the trust may need to pay trustee fees.6" Fifth, a
credit shelter trust is a separate taxpayer for income tax purposes,6' which
means that separate accountings and income tax returns are necessary each
year. Finally, a trust often creates a need for attorneys and related
expenses.62
Because of the complexity and unnecessary expenses related to credit
shelter trusts, it is apparent why President Bush and a significant number of
the members of Congress have pushed for a complete repeal of the estate
tax.63 Unfortunately, at least for large estates with highly appreciated
assets, the situation under repeal with respect to the simplification of basic
estate planning does not appear to be any better than before repeal.

55 This is certainly not intended to be an all-inclusive list. This list merely represents
certain fundamental issues that have arisen in the context of the author's estate planning
practice.
56 Cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-906 (1997) (noting that residuary property may be
converted to cash for distribution, but this may not be a desired result when the residuary
property
57 is real estate).
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-1-301, 15-1-509, 15-1-804(1), 15-16-303 (1997).
58 See id.
59 Cf IND. CODE § 30-4-3-4 (2002) (requiring unanimity for exercising powers if there
are two
60 trustees and a majority if there are three or more trustees).
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-417 (Supp. 2002).
61 See I.R.C. § 641 (West 2000).
62 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
63

15-14-417(6) (Supp. 2002).

See Mohr & Rojas, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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C. Step-Up Trusts After Repeal
After repeal, the primary tax issue for large estates will be how to make
use of the first-spouse-to-die's full $1.3 million basis step-up for assets
transferred to someone other than the surviving spouse. A transfer of all
assets of the estate to the surviving spouse outright (or to a marital trust that
qualifies as a transfer to the surviving spouse for income tax basis step-up
purposes) will result in a waste of up to a $1.3 million basis step-up, much
like the wasting of the unified credit that could occur after the 1976 Act. If
the surviving spouse subsequently sells those assets, the surviving spouse
unnecessarily will pay a capital gains tax of up to $260,000. 64 To avoid
this waste, estate planning after and in anticipation of repeal will likely
incorporate the concept of a step-up trust that will qualify for the $1.3
million basis step-up while giving the surviving spouse a certain degree of
access to the trust assets.65
All the undesirable issues of credit shelter trusts mentioned above will
continue to exist with step-up trusts. In the areas in which surviving
spouses would have been unsatisfied with a credit shelter trust, they will
experience the same dissatisfaction with a step-up trust. In addition,
funding the step-up trust will be much more difficult than funding a credit
shelter trust because, rather than basing the amount passing into the trust on
the fair market value of assets at the time of funding, the amount passing
into the trust will be based on the amount of unrealized gain in certain
assets at the time of funding.66
IV. ANALYSIS OF REPEAL UNDER EGTRRA
A. In General
Under EGTRRA, the post-repeal $1.3 million step-up in basis, as with
the present applicable exclusion amount, may not be transferred between
spouses. Thus, as with the applicable exclusion amount before repeal, the
first-spouse-to-die's $1.3 million step-up in basis is wasted if the first
spouse leaves everything outright to the surviving spouse. Whether this

64 This assumes the current long-term capital gains rate of 20% (i.e., 20% of $1.3
million).
65 See Hastings & Covey, supra note 5, at 48-53.
66 However, if a fractional funding clause is used, then the amount presumably will be

based on the amount of unrealized gain on the date of death.
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system is good tax policy should be analyzed based on
tax policy standards
67
of equity, administrative efficiency, and neutrality.
B. Equity
1. HorizontalEquity
The concept of horizontal equity requires that similarly situated
taxpayers bear similar tax burdens.6 8 With respect to estates after repeal of
the estate tax, the relevant taxpayer for purposes of this analysis is not the
decedent. Instead, the relevant taxpayer is the beneficiary or beneficiaries
of the decedent's estate because the decedent or, more accurately, the estate
of the decedent will not be paying any federal estate tax after repeal. The
beneficiary or beneficiaries of the decedent's estate, on the other hand, may
pay capital gains taxes upon a subsequent disposition of inherited assets,
assuming sufficient appreciation in the estate. In this context, the sole child
(and sole heir) of a married couple that dies nearly simultaneously is a
convenient illustration.
For purposes of this analysis, compare the child of a couple with $10
million in highly appreciated assets ("Child A") with the child of another
couple with $10 million in highly appreciated assets ("Child B"). Assume,
for simplicity, that each $10 million in assets has an income tax basis of
zero and that Child A's parents both die at the same time as Child B's
parents (i.e., all four deaths occur simultaneously). For tax purposes, Child
A and Child B are similarly situated taxpayers. Therefore, horizontal equity
dictates that Child A and Child B should achieve equivalent income tax
consequences upon selling inherited assets. Unfortunately, this is not
necessarily the case.
Assume that the only asset of Child A's parents at the time of their
deaths was a single piece of real estate that the parents owned as tenants-incommon. Assume further that they had not hired an estate planning
attorney and, knowing that the estate tax was repealed, prepared their own
simple wills using a basic will form. Their wills leave everything to the
surviving spouse outright. Now assume that Child B's parents, on the other
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See John E. Donaldson, The Futureof Transfer Taxation, Repeal, Restructuringand

Refinement or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 539, 550-51 (1993); see generally
WILLIAM A. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1976); Joseph T.
Sneed The Criteriaof FederalIncome Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1965).
See Donaldson, supra note 67, at 545. See also Richard Schmalbeck, Income
Averaging After Twenty Years: A FailedExperiment in HorizontalEquity, 1984 DUKE L. J.
509, 546.
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hand, owned a highly appreciated portfolio of readily marketable securities
(50% owned by each parent). Child B's parents consulted an estate
planning attorney who drafted their wills to include a step-up trust to take
full advantage of the first-spouse-to-die's $1.3 million step-up in basis.
Under these facts, a subsequent disposition of assets by Child A and Child
B at the same time will result in Child A paying $260,00069 in capital gains
taxes that Child B will not pay.
As indicated with the above example, Child A's and Child B's tax
situations are dependent, in significant part, on whether their parents
employed estate planning attorneys. This example does not consider
complicating factors such as ownership as joint tenants with right of
survivorship or unequal distribution of assets. In these cases, the advice of
an estate planning attorney would have been even more critical. In such
situations, the attorney probably would have advised the parents to change
the title of their assets to tenancy-in-common and to shift assets between
each other to equalize the size of their respective estates. Thus, in this
example, the similarly situated taxpayers, Child A and Child B, are only
accorded similar tax treatment if their parents retain professional advice.
In addition to the need for professional advice for estate planning, the
nature of the assets in the above example could affect significantly the
ability of the personal representative of the parents' estates to fund a stepup trust during estate administration. For example, funding a step-up trust
(had the parents' wills established one) would have been more difficult for
Child A's parents' personal representative than it would have been for
Child B's parents' personal representative. This is because Child A's
parents' personal representative would be required to fractionalize the
ownership of the real estate, causing the estate to incur unnecessary legal
expenses. The personal representative of Child B's parents' estates, on the
other hand, would not worry about fractionalizing assets because readily
marketable securities with an income tax basis of zero are relatively simple
assets to divide for purposes of funding a trust.
The potential disparity between the tax treatment of similarly situated
taxpayers is made even more apparent if one remembers that the amount
passing into the step-up trust will be determined not by the value of assets
alone as with credit shelter trusts but, instead, by the difference between the
assets' value and the decedent's basis in those assets."0 Thus, the above
example is an over-simplification of what truly will be a complex situation.
69
70

This amount is equal to 20% of $1.3 million. See supranote 64.
See supra Part III.C.

SPRING 2003

Estate Tax Repeal Under EGTRRA

87

The decedent's income tax basis will affect a family's ability to take
advantage of a step-up trust. For example, departing from the above
illustration, consider a decedent who owns, among other significant assets,
(a) one asset with a value of $1.3 million and a zero basis, (b) two assets
each with a $1.3 million value and a $650,000 basis, and (c) thirteen assets
each with a $1 million value and a $900,000 basis.71 Potentially, the stepup trust in this case could be funded with $1.3 million, $2.6 million or $13
million depending on the assets chosen.72 Thus, the decedent's income tax
basis in various assets can affect the ability to fund a step-up trust to take
advantage of a significant tax benefit. This difficulty is likely to cause
similarly situated taxpayers to pay significantly different amounts of tax.
To summarize, income tax consequences to similarly situated taxpayers
(i.e., the beneficiaries of decedents' estates) are affected by (a) the ability
of the decedent to hire attorneys, (b) the nature of the assets owned, and
(c) the income tax basis of the decedent in the assortment of assets owned.
This disparate treatment does little to achieve horizontal equity. In fact, it
likely will foster the perception that certain types of individuals are being
discriminated against. For example, farmers will be identified as being
discriminated against because they often own highly illiquid assets. They
also may not have as ready access to qualified estate planning professionals
as would a person living in a large city.
2.

Vertical Equity

The concept of vertical equity provides that taxpayers who are not
similarly situated should bear tax burdens relative to their respective
abilities to pay.73 The vertical equity implications of estate tax repeal under
EGTRRA are less severe than the horizontal equity implications because
the people who will be affected by the tax consequences of their actions are
likely to have enough money to consult estate planning professionals. That
being said, there are still some undesirable vertical equity implications here
as well.
As an example, consider a married couple with $5.6 million in
appreciated assets, such as a farm, with a basis of zero. This couple should,
after repeal, be sure to utilize a step-up trust to take advantage of the first-

71

For a similar example dealing with the issue of funding a marital trust (rather than

a step-up trust) after estate tax repeal under EGTRRA, see Hastings & Covey, supra note

5, at 44-45.
72 This assumes a choice between (a), (b), or (c).
73 See Donaldson, supra note 67, at 545; see also Schmalbeck, supra note 68, at 546.
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spouse-to-die's $1.3 million basis step-up. This couple, especially
assuming that they have few liquid assets, would be less likely to be able to
afford legal fees to set up a step-up trust and to arrange proper asset
ownership than would a couple with ten times as much ($56 million in
appreciated assets). Thus, there will be a greater chance that taxpayers with
relatively less money will bear a greater proportion of the tax on the taxable
gain on inherited assets.
C. Administrative Efficiency
Generally, administrative efficiency concerns are judged in the
following two principal ways: (1) indirect costs, which are costs to
taxpayers for attempting to comply with the law, and (2) direct costs, which
are the costs to the government for administering the tax law.74 Estate tax
repeal under EGTRRA is likely to result in large, unnecessary indirect
costs and direct costs.
1.

Indirect Costs

As indicated in the Child A and Child B example above, estate tax
repeal as it exists under EGTRRA will make basic estate planning and
estate administration for wealthy individuals even more complex than
estate planning is under the current credit shelter trust system, especially
regarding indirect costs. Wealthy individuals such as the parents in the
above example will need to pay close attention to income tax basis issues
in addition to the asset titling and trust creation issues that they presumably
now deal with in conjunction with credit shelter trust planning.75 The
complexity and length of wills will likely only increase as a result of repeal
under EGTRRA. In addition, wealthy taxpayers will need to keep detailed
records of their income tax basis in all assets, including assets that they
have no intention of ever selling. Maintenance of these basis records is not
quite as simple as it may sound. For example, real estate may have been
improved, partially sold, or depreciated after it was purchased. Stock may

74 See Donaldson, supra note 67, at 548; see also Schmalbeck, supra note 68, at 530;
Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REv.

395, 409-29 (1987).
75 This does not consider the fact that the provisions of EGTRRA sunset on December
31, 2010, making planning with any degree of certainty virtually impossible unless
individuals seeking estate planning can predict accurately the year of their deaths. See
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
38, § 901 (2001).
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have been acquired for different amounts on different dates. There may
have been mergers, and stock may have generated dividends.
In addition to the increased indirect costs of estate planning, estate
administration also will have increased indirect costs. Because of
EGTRRA, personal representatives will be required to determine both the
fair market value of each asset and the decedent's basis in each asset.
Tracking the basis of assets received from a decedent is generally more
difficult than tracking the basis of assets received by lifetime gift.76 Also,
the mere formation of a step-up trust will result in the creation of a new
taxpayer for income tax purposes. This new taxpayer must file annual
income tax returns and the trust may also need the services of lawyers and
accountants, again with the incumbent expenses.
There are also less tangible indirect costs to taxpayers. Holding
property as tenants-in-common rather than as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship, for example, may be necessary to ensure that assets are
available to fund the step-up trust. Thus, taxpayers may be pulled into the
probate process when they otherwise could have avoided it by owning
assets jointly.
2. Direct Costs
The direct costs associated with step-up trusts are less obvious but
nonetheless present. From the government's perspective, its auditors will
run into the same basis tracking issues that the beneficiaries will encounter.
The auditor will spend time reviewing wills and tax returns showing the
property that is receiving the limited step-up in basis. In addition, the
continuing administration of step-up trusts will present on-going administrative difficulties for the government. As mentioned above, the step-up
trust is a separate taxpayer from the surviving spouse. This certainly makes
the government's position more complicated, as it will have additional
income tax returns to review each year.
D. Neutrality
The concept of tax neutrality suggests that the Code, to the extent
possible, should not cause people to alter behavior solely for tax reasons

76

See Jeffrey M. Colon, ChangingU.S. Tax Jurisdiction:Expatriates, Immigrants,and

the Needfor a Coherent Tax Policy, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1,42-43 (1997) (suggesting that
death is an "involuntary conversion," and a purpose of the current step-up in basis at death
of I.R.C. § 1014 may be "to relieve heirs from having to recreate the tax history of inherited
property").

38 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL

unless there is a public policy reason for doing so.7 As far as the author is
aware, Congress does not have a stated public policy of trying to induce
people to create trusts. Therefore, step-up trusts unquestionably violate the
principle of tax neutrality.
As mentioned above, in the absence of marital strife, most taxpayers
would prefer to leave assets outright to a surviving spouse. This would
mean that most wills of wealthy married couples with no children from a
prior marriage would be fairly simple. Possibly after some relatively small
specific bequests, the wills would leave everything outright to the surviving
spouse.78 After the second-spouse-to-die's death, assets would be left to
children or other family members either outright or in trust. In this typical
situation, wills would be relatively short and simple.
Instead of short and simple wills, wealthy married couples with no
children from a prior marriage likely will have attorneys draft wills that
create step-up trusts to ensure that their families do not unnecessarily pay
taxes. These wills will be relatively long and complex and will incur
significant legal fees. After the first-spouse-to-die's death, the personal
representative (likely the surviving spouse) will need to deal with the
division of assets to fund the step-up trust, as well as on-going trust
maintenance and administration expenses.
A surviving spouse certainly would prefer to avoid all the costs and
inconveniences associated with a step-up trust. These trusts, however, will
be created for the sole purpose of minimizing capital gains taxes after the
estate tax repeal. Thus, repeal under EGTRRA, as the law is currently
drafted, fails the tax neutrality test.
V. PROPOSAL FOR SIMPLIFICATION
A. Overview of Proposal
The proposed change to EGTRRA is relatively simple. Congress
should amend I.R.C. § 102279 to provide that any unused portion of a
person's basis increase under I.R.C. § 1022(b)(2)(B) automatically passes
to the surviving spouse upon the first spouse's death. This new rule could
be written as I.R.C. § 1022(i). This proposed change will have no effect on
77 See Donaldson, supra note 67, at 550-51.
78 In certain situations, of course, everything

would be left in trust for the surviving

spouse for purely nontax reasons.
79 This is the codification of the basis step-up rule under EGTRRA that under current
law becomes effective for decedents dying after December 31, 2009 and before January 1,
2011.
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the $3 million basis increase under I.R.C. § 1022(c)(2)(B) for assets
passing to a surviving spouse (the "spousal step-up"). Thus, a basis step-up
of up to $1.3 million (the "non-spousal step-up") would pass from each
married decedent to surviving spouse, effectively increasing the surviving
spouse's non-spousal step-up to up to $2.6 million at that person's death.
Section 1022(b)(2)(B) would also need to be amended to state that each
person's non-spousal step-up at death is limited to $1.3 million plus the
value of any basis step-up received from a "qualified" spouse 81 pursuant to
I.R.C. § 1022(i).8
B. Application of Proposal
Under EGTRRA as it now exists, the personal representative of a
decedent's estate with a certain amount of appreciated assets presumably
will need to file a tax return (the "step-up return") within nine months after
the decedent's death.8 2 This step-up return will be used to report the assets
for which the basis step-up will apply. The proposal will not have any
effect on this reporting requirement.
The proposed change to EGTRRA would require one simple change to
the anticipated step-up return. The return preparer of each person who is
married at the time of death would, after computing the amount of the $1.3
million non-spousal step-up that has been used, be able to determine how
much of it remains unused at that time. The return preparer could identify
the surviving spouse on the step-up return and state that this unused amount
is passing to that person.
This reporting requirement at the first-spouse-to-die's death should not
be mandatory (i.e., transfers from qualified spouses83 should be
automatic). 84 The idea is that the reporting at the first-spouse-to-die's death
will be evidence that could be used at the second-spouse-to-die's death to
establish the amount of step-up available. Thus, for estates in which all

80
81

See author's comment regarding the identity of a qualifying spouse, infra note 87.
See I.R.C. § 1022(b)(2)(B) (2002) (providing as it currently exists that the limit on

the non-spousal step-up is $1.3 million).
82 See id. § 1022(h) (directing the Secretary to prescribe regulations to carry out the
purpose of I.R.C. § 1022). Although these regulations have not yet been issued, they likely
will require the use of some sort of tax return to obtain the benefit of the stepped-up income
tax basis. The nine-month period was chosen here merely because that is the current time
period in which one must file a Federal Estate Tax Return (Form 706).
83 See author's comment regarding the identity of a qualifying spouse, infra note 87.
84 This is important. A mandatory reporting requirement at the first death would tend
to counteract some of the simplicity sought by this proposal.
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assets are passing to the surviving spouse outright, including intestate
estates (if that is the case under state law), there would be no need to file a
step-up return at the first-spouse-to-die's death, although this may be
necessary to take advantage of the $3 million spousal step-up. With respect
to the $1.3 million nonspousal step-up, the filing of the return at the firstspouse-to-die's death would serve merely to simplify proof of available
step-up at the second-spouse-to-die's death.
At the death of the second-spouse-to-die, the personal representative of
that spouse's estate would need to file a step-up return to take advantage of
the available step-up. If a step-up return were filed with the first-spouse-todie's estate, the personal representative merely would need merely to attach
a copy of that return as presumptive evidence that the second-spouse-to-die
inherited the amount of nonspousal step-up reported on the return as being
transferred to the second-spouse-to-die.
If no step-up return were filed at the first-spouse-to-die's death, the
second-spouse-to-die's personal representative would bear the burden of
proving that the second-spouse-to-die inherited the first-spouse-to-die's
nonspousal step-up. This proof would be fairly easy. The personal
representative would merely need to identify the first-spouse-to-die,
including that person's social security number, that spouse's date of death,
and the date of marriage of the spouses. If no step-up return were filed at
the first-spouse-to-die's death, the second-spouse-to-die presumptively
would have an available step-up of $2.6 million.
There admittedly are two problem areas with this proposal. First,
commentators certainly will assert that the proposal discriminates against
people who live together in a committed relationship without being
married, both heterosexual and homosexual.85 There is no correct solution
to this problem. Our tax system has long favored legally married couples
and also has sought to treat these couples as a single economic unit.86
Right or wrong, the support for the special preference for married couples
in this country is indisputably overwhelming. This proposal, in giving
preference to married people, is in accordance with that view.

85 Cf Nancy E. Shurtz, Symposium: Critical Tax Theory: Still Not Taken Seriously, 76

N.C. L. REv. 1837, 1855-56 (1998) (discussing the historical aspects of feminism and tax

law).86

Cf S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 127 (1981), reprinted
in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.)

228 (explaining the tax treatment of real property held by husband and wife as joint
tenants).
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Second, dealing with the situation of multiple marriages is difficult.
Should a person be able to marry and survive an unlimited number of
spouses to obtain each deceased spouse's additional step-up? There are
three possible approaches. One approach would be to limit the total
amount of nonspousal step-up that a person could possibly have to some
amount, for example, $2.6 million. However, this approach would still
allow people to benefit from multiple marriages (i.e., a person could absorb
$650,000 from two separate spouses). A second approach would be to
allow a transfer from only one predeceased spouse. A sub-issue would be
how to choose the spouse-the first, the last, or some spouse in between.
A final approach would be to allow an unlimited nonspousal step-up (i.e.,
if a person married and survived ten different people sequentially, that
person could potentially inherit a total of $13 million in additional basis
step-up). The necessary assumption in the third approach would be that
people are not marrying merely to absorb each spouse's nonspousal stepup. There is no correct solution to the multiple marriages problem. In the
interest of administrative simplicity and perceived fairness of the system,
this Article proposes allowing a transfer from only one predeceased
spouse-the decedent's first spouse to die in or after the year 2010.87
C. Analysis of Proposal
1. Equity
a.

HorizontalEquity

As mentioned above, horizontal equity requires similarly situated
taxpayers to bear similar tax burdens.88 For illustration purposes, consider
what would happen in the Child A-Child B example above 89 if the proposal
of this Article were the law and if the parents of Child A and Child B were
all to die in the year 2010.90
Recall that Child A's parents owned a $10 million piece of real estate
with a basis of zero as tenants-in-common and that they had prepared
simple wills leaving everything outright to the surviving spouse. Recall too
that Child B's parents each owned 50% of a portfolio of readily marketable

87 This first spouse would be defined in the Code as the only qualified spouse.
88 See Donaldson, supra note 67, at 545; Schmalbeck, supra note 68, at 546.
89 See supra IV.B. 1.
90 For purposes of this analysis, assume further that both sets of parents are in

their
first and only marriage and that their preference would be to leave everything outright to the
surviving spouse and, if that spouse is not alive, outright to their child.
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securities, with a basis of zero, and they had had an attorney prepare
complex wills, which took advantage of the first-spouse-to-die's
nonspousal step-up.
Assuming, for convenience of explanation, that each father dies
moments before each mother, then Child A's and Child B's tax situations
would be identical. In Child A's case, Child A's father's estate would
automatically get a step-up of $3 million for assets passing to Child A's
mother.9' Furthermore, a $1.3 million basis step-up amount would pass
from Child A's father to Child A's mother for her use at death under the
proposed new section of the Code.92 On Child A's mother's death
(moments after Child A's father's death), she would have the father's $1.3
million step-up available to her in addition to her own $1.3 million stepup.9 3 Thus, Child A would receive all $10 million in assets with a
combined income tax basis of $5.6 million.94 If Child A then were to sell
the real estate immediately, Child A would need to pay a capital gains tax
of $880,000. 95
In the case of Child B, Child B's father's estate would get a step-up of
$3 million for the assets passing to the mother and an additional $1.3
million for assets passing into a step-up trust. At Child B's mother's
subsequent death, her estate would be entitled to an additional step-up of
$1.3 million. The total step-up available to the combined estates of B's
mother and father would be $5.6 million, the same amount available to the
combined estates of Child A's mother and father. An immediate sale by
Child B of all of Child B's parents' assets, would result in Child B's
needing to pay a capital gains tax of $880,000. Thus, Child A and B in this
example would pay identical amounts in taxes.
In addition to the above benefit, there are some other less obvious
horizontal equity benefits to a change in the law. First, the manner of
titling assets as between spouses would not cause a waste of the first
spouse's step-up. In the Child A-Child B hypothetical, for example, it
would make no difference if ChildA's parents owned the real estate as joint

9l See I.R.C.

§ 1022(c)(2)(B) (2002).

See supra Part V.A. (describing the proposed change to § 1022(1)).
93 See supra Part V.A. (describing the proposed amendment to § 1022(b)(2)(B)).
94 This number is the sum of $3 million plus $1.3 million plus $1.3 million.
95 This figure is equal to 20% of $4.4 million ($10 million minus $5.6 million). This
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calculation assumes that the piece of real estate is not deemed to be Child A's primary
residence for the purposes of the $250,000 exclusion of gain from the sale of a primary
residence under I.R.C. § 12 1(b) (2002).
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tenants with rights of survivorship.96 Second, intestacy would not change
the result if the state's intestacy law provides that all assets pass to the
surviving spouse. Finally, funding a step-up trust would not require the
fractionalization of assets. Each of these benefits puts taxpayers on more
equal97 footing from a horizontal equity standpoint regardless of whether
they hire attorneys.9 8
b.

Vertical Equity

As mentioned above, vertical equity requires taxpayers who are not
similarly situated to bear tax burdens relative to their abilities to pay.99
With the proposed change to the law, the fact that some people may have
more money to hire attorneys does not mean that their heirs necessarily will
bear a smaller proportion of the tax on the taxable gain on inherited assets.
As explained above, the tax results, with or without an attorney, will be
comparable. Thus, vertical equity is achieved under the proposal.
2. Administrative Efficiency
a. Indirect Costs

The proposal in this Article will certainly help to reduce indirect costs
(costs to the taxpayer). While wealthy individuals still will need to be
careful to keep records of their income tax basis in their assets both (1) for
the convenience of their heirs, and (2) to maximize the benefits of the $5.6
million total step-up for married couples, basis issues will be greatly
simplified under the proposal.
As a result of Congress's adoption of the proposal, wealthy married
couples would not need to spend as much time attempting to title their
assets appropriately in order to obtain the maximum basis step-up. °° Thus,
the indirect costs of estate planning should be reduced. Assuming that a
couple has sufficient assets for this to be an issue, they merely would need
to ensure that the first-spouse-to-die owns assets with at least $3 million in

It would still be important, however, to make sure that the first spouse to die owns
enough appreciated assets to take full advantage of the $3 million spousal step-up.
As explained below, some tax issues related to timing of realization of gain may
merit more complex planning. See infra Part V.C.4.
98 This change only makes a difference from a purely tax perspective. As mentioned
above, estate planning advice from attorneys may be necessary for many nontax reasons.
See Donaldson, supra note 67, at 545; Schmalbeck, supra note 68, at 546.
100 This statement assumes marital harmony and a desire to leave all assets, either
outright or in trust, to the surviving spouse.
96
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unrealized appreciation at death. As in the Child A-Child B example
above,1 °1 joint ownership of property can suffice for this purpose.
Therefore, these wealthy individuals may be less motivated for solely tax
reasons to title their assets other than as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship.
Indirect costs of estate administration should also be reduced. Most
significantly, assuming that a couple wants to leave everything outright to
each other, executors would not need to waste the time and money to fund
a step-up trust. They would not need to report the nonspousal step-up
assets on a tax return at the first-spouse-to-die's death, and the surviving
spouse would continue living as if she and her husband still owned the
assets. 2 The family would not need to waste money administering a trust
that exists only for tax reasons. The surviving spouse could do with her
money as she wished without worrying about fiduciary obligations. If she
wished to have help administering her assets, she could hire and fire people
03
to do this at will. 1
b. Direct Costs
The proposal will also reduce direct costs to the government.
Whenever a married person leaves all his assets to a spouse, the
government would not need to review provisions of a tax return that
attempt to maximize the $1.3 million nonspousal step-up.° 4 With less need
to set up trusts, fewer taxpayers will need monitoring from the government's perspective. This certainly reduces direct costs to the government.
3. Neutrality
This proposal attempts to help EGTRRA be more tax neutral. As
mentioned above, tax neutrality suggests that the Code should not cause
people to alter behavior solely for tax reasons unless there is a specific
policy reason for doing so.' ° Because Congress does not appear to have a

101 See supra Part IV.B.1.
102
103

For purposes of this example, assume that the wife survived the husband.
In the author's experience, this example is commonly the kind of control and

freedom a happily married couple would like the surviving spouse to have.
104 However, returns presumably will be necessary to take advantage of the firstspouse-to-die's $3 million spousal step-up. Also, the surviving spouse may want to file a
return reporting the $1.3 million step-up for evidentiary purposes at that spouse's later
death.
105 See Donaldson, supra note 67, at 550-51.

SPRING 2003

Estate Tax Repeal Under EGTRRA

97

public policy reason for inducing people to create trusts, its tax policy
should not do so, if possible.
This proposal represents a simple way for Congress to minimize the
unnecessary, purely tax-motivated inducement to create trusts. This
proposal would not prevent people from creating trusts for nontax reasons.
The proposed change, however, would minimize, though not eliminate, the
tax-motivated creation of step-up trusts.
4. Additional Issues
a.

Timing

The proposal will not completely eliminate a tax-motivated desire to
create step-up trusts because of the timing of the realization of gains.
Unfortunately, there is no simple way to eliminate this problem.
As the reader no doubt will have noticed, all examples used in this
Article assume near-simultaneous deaths of spouses. This assumption
helps to simplify what can be a very complex issue. Specifically, some
couples may still want to use step-up trusts to allow the surviving spouse,
or actually the trustee of the step-up trust, to sell assets with up to $1.3
million in unrealized gains during the surviving spouse's lifetime, rather
than after the surviving spouse's death. The author has been unable to
devise a simple, tax-neutral way to address this issue.
This Article's proposal will not let the surviving spouse benefit from
the tax-free realization of $1.3 million of gain from the first-spouse-to-die's
estate until the second-spouse-to-die's death. °6 If this benefit is desired,
estate planning attorneys certainly will be able to devise a step-up trust that
will immediately allow for the untaxed realization of $1.3 million in gain.
Very wealthy older couples are unlikely to create step-up trusts solely
for this purpose, especially given the administrative burdens and expenses
associated with step-up trusts. In a marriage between people with great age
differences, a surviving spouse may have a desire to sell certain appreciated
assets during the surviving spouse's lifetime. Such desire undoubtedly will
result in the creation of some step-up trusts for this purpose.
b.

Revenue

The adoption of this proposal certainly will affect tax revenue;
however, because estate and gift tax revenue represents such a small

106 However, the surviving spouse will be able to benefit from the $3 million spousal
step-up during life.
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portion of federal tax receipts, this effect should be relatively small. This
negative effect results solely from the fact that under EGTRRA, as it now
exists, some people are likely to fail to plan to maximize the benefits of the
first-spouse-to-die's $1.3 million nonspousal step-up (i.e., some people will
not, by choice or by failure to work with an attorney, create step-up trusts).
However, attempting to maximize government revenue by hoping that
people will not create complex estate plans to minimize taxes seems
inappropriate.

VI. CONCLUSION
The proposal for simplification raised in this Article is not a perfect
solution. However, it does address an issue likely to surface as a result of
EGTRRA with a simple, taxpayer-friendly change to the Code. When the
proposed change is analyzed based on tax policy standards of equity,
administrative efficiency, and neutrality, the proposal is far superior to the
system we currently have under EGTRRA.

